This article aims to assess the contribution of current international human rights law to the multicultural debate. The article argues that although international law has not engaged in a sustained way with the concept, the basic elements of multiculturalism are in fact promoted by current standards. Among these discussed are the recognition of cultural attachments in the public sphere, the need for interaction among cultures, and the understanding of sub-national groups as equal partners in the evolution of the society. A closer look at the standards and their dynamic interpretation by UN bodies also reveals helpful answers to difficult challenges currently posed by multiculturalism, including extremism and clashes between cultural practices and other human rights.
I. INTRoDUcTIoN
Although multiculturalism has been discussed for quite some time, in the last few years it has taken a prime position in popular discussions. Several commentators have claimed that multicultural policies are to blame for the rise of extremism, as these policies encourage the segregation of cultural groups.
1 Many insist that religious and cultural attachments should remain in the private sphere and should not be supported or encouraged by the state. 2 In several European states, including France, this is enshrined in law. 3 Multiculturalism is further accused of ignoring the national identity; even more so, of inciting disrespect towards it. The argument goes that individuals are encouraged to develop their cultural allegiances, rather than solely their national identity. State officials have also taken part in the debate. For example, the United Kingdom Chairperson of the Commission for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips, has suggested that multiculturalism has brought us into a position of racial segregation where "we've focused far too much on the 'multi' and not enough on the common culture." 4 A year later, former UK Home Secretary Jack Straw wrote that wearing the veil is "a visible statement of separation and of difference." 5 In 2007, the discussion once again focused on immigrants; many commentators now ask for serious restrictions on immigrants, including restrictions for EU immigrants. Similar discussions are simultaneously taking place in other states, especially after ethnic tensions unfolded in France and in Australia. In November 2007, Italy passed a controversial law that allows the deportation of EU citizens with previous convictions, a radical step that may not stand the test of EU law. 6 Issues of immigration, loyalty to the state, extremism, alienation, and exclusion have all become interlinked.
To this debate international law has at first glance remained an outsider. Human rights literature has not focused on the concept of multiculturalism, while the continuing debate on the need for multicultural policies has not really taken into account the standards of international law. Yet, if the aim of international human rights law is to ensure that domestic policies satisfy common standards of individual protection, any debate on state policies relevant to cultural membership and diversity cannot be complete without taking into account the states' obligations, if any, according to international law. This article argues that although the scarcity of references to the term "multiculturalism" suggests otherwise, on closer inspection, current human rights law endorses the components of multicultural policies and reflects a multicultural vision. The article aims to highlight the multicultural elements in international instruments and international bodies' opinions and to discuss current challenges concerning multiculturalism.
II. MULTIcULTURALISM AND INTERNATIoNAL LAw
Multiculturalism is not a term explicitly mentioned in any human rights or international law instrument. Also, only sparse references can be found in UN discussions. This can be justified mainly by the volatile reception that the term has enjoyed-especially in states' platforms-but also by its elusive definition. 7 Different versions of the concept appeal to different commentators. Multiculturalism is used as a descriptive term that suggests a poly-ethnic society; an ideology that accepts that ethnic groups wish to maintain their language and cultural traditions within the state; a "principle for social policies" that aim to eliminate "structural disadvantages and" to ensure substantial equality and access; and policies that include special institutions "designed to implement the principles of participation, access," and equality.
8 Bhikhu Parekh emphasizes the distinction between a multicultural society-a society where cultural diversity exists, and multiculturalism (or a multiculturalist policy)-the normative response to the cultural diversity of the society. 9 The limited usage of the term multiculturalism by UN bodies follows the above descriptions. In 2006, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination and all Forms of Discrimination included a section in his report on multiculturalism, where he confirmed that political agendas currently focus on protecting the "national identity" with racist overtones. 10 Still, the term "multiculturalism" was used to express the reality of multi-ethnic societies, rather than any policy or ideal. Hence, no analysis was included on the need for or the challenges of multiculturalism. More elaborate was the analysis during the 2005 discussions on multiculturalism by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). The Chairperson confirmed that the "Committee members often disagreed" on the HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY term and explained that the discussion was aimed at reaching "a common understanding of that concept"; however, no consensus was reached. 11 A future recommendation on the issue was suggested, but such a step has not been taken. A reference to multiculturalism by the Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Minorities 12 and growing references by treaty bodies in the concluding observations to state reports are some of the other limited references to the term within the UN context. Even though they suggest a positive understanding of the concept as a vehicle for equality and harmony at the national level, they too avoid explaining the meaning of the concept.
Would a definition of multiculturalism by UN bodies be desirable? Not necessarily so; international law refrains from sharp and tight definitions that may limit the flexibility of applying instruments to different circumstances.
13
Concepts such as minorities and indigenous peoples have not been defined; on the contrary, debates within relevant international law fora have confirmed that the quest for formal definitions can be a lengthy and futile exercise that is often used as a means to delay the imposition of state obligations and ultimately the protection of human rights. Rather, an analysis of the elements of the concept appears more practical and desirable. Such elements include the formal recognition of cultural groups in the public sphere and the recognition of rights to such groups and their members. Multiculturalism also involves a state policy of rethinking the national story and national identity. It is the understanding that all identities are in a process of transition. It then develops a balance between cohesion, equality, and difference. Finally, it addresses and eliminates all forms of racism, reducing material inequalities, and builds a pluralistic human rights culture.
14 This article will show that these issues have been discussed by UN bodies and some of them form part of the current standards of international law; they are standards that the states have agreed to respect.
III. IMpoRTANcE of cULTURE
Multiculturalism is primarily about respecting and celebrating the culture of the individual in the public sphere. Why culture should be protected has been answered in different ways. Some scholars argue that we cannot perceive 15 ourselves away from the allegiances we belong to (communitarian view).
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Others argue that everyone has the right to form their own perception of good in whatever way they choose without being restricted by their cultural values (liberal view). 16 International law recognizes the importance of culture for the individual. UNESCO instruments, for example, have been very explicit in protecting culture; even though one should not forget that originally some of them aimed at the protection of states' national culture. 17 Still, the 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation has declared the respect that nations should have to "the distinctive character of each" culture, 18 whereas the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity notes "that culture is at the heart of contemporary debates" on identity and social cohesion and affirms that respect for the diversity of cultures is necessary for international peace. 19 This Declaration goes on to say that the diversity of cultures is as important "as biodiversity is for nature."
20 It views the defense of cultural diversity as "an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity." 21 The text supports cultural pluralism 22 and links the protection of culture to human rights. 23 The 1989 UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore protects specifically the culture of sub-national groups, 24 while the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions maintains that cultural diversity can be protected only though human rights, including the right to choose cultural expressions. a specific cultural group reproduces over time and which provides individuals with the required signposts and meanings for behaviour and social relationships in everyday life.
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In this broad sense, the right to culture incorporates protection for knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs, and habits. Culture is related to language, literature, philosophy, religion, science, and technology as well as "'ideological systems' (knowledge, beliefs, values, etc.)."
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This wide understanding has a great influence on the scope of the right to culture and supports the further recognition of collective cultural rights: if culture relates to all aspects of life of a sub-national group, the collective element of the right to a culture seems generic and its recognition necessary. However, the wide understanding of culture also raises concerns about whether the right to culture protects areas already protected by the right to religion, language, or education. Indeed, using the right to culture as an umbrella right would run the danger of distorting the meaning and scope of the right and would eventually demean and devalue it. The right to culture must be mostly understood as incorporating aspects that are not already covered by other rights, especially when these rights are solidly protected in international law. At the same time, one has to recognize that the borders between culture and religion or ethnicity are sometimes very unclear, especially because the meaning of culture incorporates belief. HRC General Comment 22 on the Right of Thought, Conscience and Religion has also advocated for a wide understanding of the right to religion, including the right to hold "theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief." 45 Because the right to culture is not as well established as the right to religion in international law, this blurring of the terms religion and culture enables the better consolidation of some claims by using the right to religion as their legal basis.
IV. MINoRITY RIGHTS/SpEcIAL RIGHTS
Even if one recognizes the importance of culture, there can still be some skepticism about the recognition of cultural membership in the public sphere. Critics often focus on two issues: first, the alleged impact cultural attachments may have on the autonomy of the individual, and second, the argument that state institutions should not operate on culture-relative criteria.
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Jeremy Indeed, the attachment to one's cultural framework, some believe, encourages blind fanaticism and ultimately strips members of their free and informed decisions. If the individual is perceived as a fundamentally autonomous agent, she must remain free to act in accordance with her own rationality and her independent notion of what is good and valuable without the influence of cultural frameworks. 46 In a globalized world, however, it is unrealistic to expect an uncompromised degree of autonomy. The individual does not live in her own glass bubble protected from any influence; every day, she comes in contact with various opinions and different views and approaches. Indeed, it is doubtful whether a secular environment can sufficiently protect this notion of autonomy. Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka hold that moral autonomy can only be developed through a self-understanding that can only be sustained in interaction with others. According to Taylor, "the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix" that promotes this exact idea of autonomy and gives opportunities for the individual to practice and develop her autonomy. 47 Kymlicka argues that each person needs the security of the cultural framework from which she makes her choices. 48 Cultural membership seems crucial to the development and ultimately the autonomy of the individual. For this, equal respect for every culture is paramount.
Recognition of cultural attachments in the public sphere can also lead to decision-making according to specific cultural or religious values and criteria; this can get in the way of objective decisions based on culturally neutral, predetermined criteria. In the West, the solution is secularism, the idea of a state that does not take a position on cultures and remains neutral. 49 However, can a state really be neutral? I believe that this is not possible. 50 In the face of unequal opportunities and unequal treatment between the majority and minorities, state neutrality is in effect an affirmation of the way of life, the choices, and the ideas of the dominant group within the state. 51 The neutral state does not promote justice; rather, it maintains the status quo. Members of minority cultural groups do not have the same opportunities to live and work in their own culture and make their own choices to the same degree as the members of majority cultures. The only way to rectify their disadvantage is by providing them with special rights. Then, they will be given a similar degree of opportunities as members of the majority culture. Thus, special rights are accepted in order to ensure equality of circumstances and redress the vulnerability of non-dominant groups. Within this context, the question is shifted from whether the state must take a position by recognizing collective rights to which position the state will take: the position of the dominant group by maintaining a seemingly neutral position or the position of the vulnerable groups by recognizing collective rights in an attempt to redress the balance. Even though this discussion seems ongoing in political theory, international law has long accepted special measures as legitimate means by which to approach equality. Even as far back as 1935, the Permanent Court of Justice made the distinction between formal equality (ultimately, the neutral state thesis) and substantial equality (attempted by the recognition of collective rights). The Court noted that equality in fact "excludes the idea of a merely formal equality." 52 The Court explained: "Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different situations." Also, in the discussions on state reports, the HRC has repeatedly insisted on stressing this option to the states. In 2007, for example, the Committee urged the Georgian government to "take all appropriate measures to ensure" that minorities have "adequate political representation and participation" and can enjoy their languages. 56 The Committee also urged Austria and the Czech Republic to take positive measures with respect to the Roma. 57 The Declara- Of special interest is the comment of CERD about the opinion of the United States that special measures are "allowed," but not required.
With regard to affirmative action, the Committee notes with concern the position taken by the State party that the provisions of the Convention permit, but do not require States parties to adopt affirmative action measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial, ethnic or national groups. The Committee emphasizes that the adoption of special measures by States parties when the circumstances so warrant, such as in the case of persistent disparities, is an obligation stemming from article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention.
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Similar was the reception of the report of France. Although members of the Committee acknowledged the republican tradition in France, they expressed their doubts about "whether an anti-racist strategy could succeed if the State did not address the particular features of a community in addition to the universality of citizenship."
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At the same time, ICERD sets limitations to affirmative action. Specifically, special measures must only be taken for the advancement of minority rights, must be temporary in nature, and should not lead to separate rights for different groups. 63 Indeed, it must be acknowledged that not all affirmative measures have positive consequences. Tom Hadden notes that governments have a genuine choice in the measures they can apply when dealing with minorities and enumerates the policies states may adopt. 64 Positive measures can have negative consequences-measures specifically for members of cultural groups focus on the minority elements of their identities and separate them on this basis from the rest of the population. Apart from ignoring other elements of their identities, these measures can perpetuate their exclusion. 65 This concern became obvious, for example, in CERD's 2006 concluding observations to South Africa. Although the Committee welcomed the adoption of positive measures by the state, it cautioned that such action may lead to the "maintenance of unequal or separate rights for those groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." 66 In some cases, positive measures also lead to more hostile attitudes by the rest of the population, as such measures are perceived as unfair to them. This can increase the tensions between the communities and the negative perceptions of minorities, with negative consequences to their rights. Any affirmative action will need to take the costs into account; yet, these considerations should not result in the abandonment of affirmative action altogether. As Ronald Dworkin concluded in his discussion on US higher education, unless and until a large and sophisticated study proves otherwise, "we have no reason to forbid university affirmative action as a weapon against our deplorable racial stratification, except our indifference to that problem, or our petulant anger that it has not gone away on its own."
67

V. NATIoNAL IDENTITY, SEGREGATIoN AND INTERNATIoNAL LAw
David Goodhart argues that if the state recognizes and protects non-dominant cultural groups, national identity will be devalued. 68 Martin Wolf similarly argues that multiculturalism "is dangerous because it destroys political community . . . [and] demeaning because it devalues citizenship." 69 As mentioned earlier, Trevor Phillips, the Chairperson of the Commission for Racial Equality, has suggested that multiculturalism as applied in the United Kingdom, has lead to segregation because ethnic groups live in separate entities with no interaction with each other.
70
It cannot be denied that multiculturalism challenges the dominant culture and recognizes more allegiances than only that to the state. Challenges to the monotheism of the state are not novel in international law. The idea that human rights are not solely domestic affairs, an increase in the number of entities that enjoy legal personality, 71 75 It also recognizes that people living in the same continent have common values, a "common culture"; hence it accepts regional systems of human rights protection. This is expressed for example, in Article 1(a) of the Statute of the Council of Europe, which proclaims that the aim of the organization "is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage."
76 Finally, international law accepts the common culture we all share, as evident by the recognition of the right to the culture of mankind. All these groups represent a series of multiple loyalties that the individual may have and various cultures that the individual can be influenced by.
Do the recognition of groups other than the state and the recognition of multiple identities undermine the national identity? Does multiculturalism encourage the proliferation of "fundamentalist" views?
77 My answer to this question is negative. On the contrary, it is the emphasis on one culture that runs the danger of inciting extremism. Paul Gilroy urges against "the comfort blanket of imagined monoculture."
78 UN bodies also seem to agree on this matter. The 2005 World Summit Outcome has recognized the importance of inclusion of minorities for the promotion of global security by noting "that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to political and social stability and peace and enrich the cultural diversity and heritage of society." 79 [P]olitical agendas are increasingly focused on protecting the "national identity," "defending the national interest," safeguarding the "national heritage," giving priority to "national preference in employment," or combating "illegal foreign immigration." Against the background of the general trend towards multiculturalism in most societies, this rhetoric becomes the new political expression of discrimination and xenophobia owing to its two main political projections: a rejection or non-recognition of multiculturalism and cultural diversity and especially an identification of all those the nation needs to defend itself against, namely non-nationals, ethnic, cultural or religious minorities, immigrants and asylum-seekers. Political, social, economic and cultural discrimination constitutes the natural expression of this defensive and protective national rhetoric.
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The idea of a single culture excludes the group from the influences of other cultures and perpetuates the false perception that cultural membership is predetermined and firmly fixed. Groups become rigid and pushed into mutually exclusive oppositions. The approach of "otherness" generally denies the particularities of the various groups and overlooks variations among the individuals belonging to the same group. It leads to fear of the other group (xenophobia), nationalism, and incites discourses about the purity and virtue of a particular group and its culture.
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The continuing discrimination and exclusion of certain groups from mainstream society explain the radicalization in Europe. 82 Individuals coming from oppressed groups, groups that are excluded from the public life, are more likely to alienate themselves even more, to create a completely separate system, and to try to undermine the state's sovereignty. Tariq Modood reminds us of the "ethnicity paradox," the conviction of US sociologists Robert Park and W.I. Thomas "that allowing ethnic communities to take root and flourish in the new soil was the most satisfactory way of promoting long-term integration and participation in the institutions of the wider US community." Modood notes that "allowing more space to ethnic minority communities to do their own thing enables them to become a feature of the new society and creates a secure base from which participation in the institutions of the wider society follows." 83 Andrew Mason notes that "a sense of belonging to a polity can provide the basis for patriotism, understood simply as a love of its central institutions and practices." 84 According to him, "a person has a sense of belonging to a polity" only when "she identifies with most of its major institutions,"
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Id perceives them as valuable, conducive to her flourishing, and reflective of her concerns. 85 Ultimately, he argues, a person has this sense of belonging only when she has the ability to find her way around the institutions of the polity and to experience her participation in them. 86 The recognition of multiple loyalties creates the space for such sense of belonging, which in turn strengthens national identity without discarding other cultural frameworks.
So far it has been argued that recognition of multiple cultural frameworks allows space for the national identity. Even more so, by accepting other important cultural allegiances, multicultural policies avoid unnecessary choices among the individual's national and other identities. However, the mere recognition of multiple identities does not lead to a truly multicultural society; measures aimed at the protection of the groups' distinctiveness can lead to segregation. Indeed, truly multicultural policies do not aim for the co-existence of various cultures as separate entities that happen to exist and develop independently within the state. The existence of separate and mutually exclusive systems does not protect the minorities in question; on the contrary, it contributes to the exclusion of these groups and the worsening of the tension and hostility between the various groups of the society.
International law is eager to emphasize the importance of interaction among groups living within the same state. For example, ICESCR Article 13 establishes that "education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups." The CRC states that education must develop "respect for the child's . . . own cultural identity, language and values [as well as] for the national values of the country in which the child is living." 87 The Declaration of the Principles on Tolerance also proclaims that "[e]ducation for tolerance should be considered an urgent imperative." 88 The 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation declares that "[i]n their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind." 89 The Declaration makes clear that cultural cooperation, aiming at the mutual benefit of the nations practicing it, is a right and a duty for all peoples and nations and should be exercised in a spirit of broad reciprocity. All nations must respect the distinctive character of each culture, while promoting their 90 .
Id enrichment in an atmosphere of friendship and peace. 90 The Declaration on Minorities also stresses the need for mutual knowledge and understanding between minorities and the majority within the state. 91 The preamble of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities refers to "a pluralist and genuinely democratic society" as the model to be achieved and emphasizes "that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment of each society."
92 This Convention also asserts the importance of the spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue, mutual respect, and understanding that should exist among the minorities and the majority. 93 The idea of reciprocity among cultures is also emphasized in HRC General Comment 23 in relation to the protection of cultural rights: "The protection of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole."
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Calls for the promotion of dialogue among various communities, especially as part of the battle against extremism and counter-exclusive ideologies, have recently moved higher on the international agenda. In 2005, the Alliance of Civilizations, an initiative to promote such dialogue, was formed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The report of the High-level Group of Experts, whose role is to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures and to recommend a practical program of action, noted that Establishing coherent integration strategies requires regular dialogue among representatives of government and immigrant communities, civil society representatives, religious organizations and employers, engaging at local, regional, national and international levels. While informal and ad hoc engagement is valuable, institutional structures that support dialogue on a regular ongoing basis can ensure the efficacy of such approaches in promoting greater integration. Such efforts help achieve a balance between the demands of integration and the need to maintain one's cultural and religious identity.
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UN monitoring bodies have also emphasized the need for interaction between all groups within the state. At the end of 2006, the HRC noted "with concern the de facto racial segregation in public schools" in the United States
96.
Concluding and asked the state to take measures to stop such segregation. 96 During the same time, the HRC also emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina should intensify its efforts to re-establish mutual trust between different ethnic groups and account for past human rights abuses. CERD has also been critical of attempts of segregation. It strongly criticized segregated areas in Nepal for Dalits, especially after allegations that public funds are used for the construction of separate water taps for Dalits. 97 The committee also suggested that Guyana establish a Constitutional Committee on Inter-Cultural Dialogue.
98
At the same time though, UN bodies are too aware of how states can use arguments of segregation to disenfranchise minority groups. Hence, CERD condemned measures by Denmark that obliged minorities to be dispersed, as this could have an impact on their right to freedom of residence and their enjoyment and practice of their cultural rights. 99 Usually, programs for intercultural awareness focus on education. The unification of segregated schools, the teaching of the history of minorities rather than just of the majority, the removal of mono-ethnic and mono-religious symbols and flags from schools, and a core curriculum that is "sensitive to the diverse cultural attributes of the various ethnic groups" are issues that are often discussed.
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Within this vision of international law that includes a plurality of voices and cultures in the public sphere, minority groups must be seen as equal partners with the majority group, rather than mere negotiators or imitators. In this manner international law follows the idea of critical pluralism that Adeno Addis has put forward. 101 Contrary to paternalistic pluralism, where sub-national groups are viewed as "others" and their rights are protected as a means to save them from the majority, in critical pluralism, sub-national groups are seen as partners in the evolution of the society. When adhering to the theory of critical pluralism, the state actively engages in a dialogue with groups in order to find the best way and resources to allow cultures to flourish. Moreover, the state creates institutions that enable the rest of the population to open up to all groups, by accepting them all as dialogue partners. 102 The the importance of cultural pluralism and political democracy. 103 Critical pluralism is encouraged in international law through various provisions on the participation of minority groups in the decision-making process of the (democratic) society they live in. 104 A notable example is the Declaration on Minorities, which proclaims that "minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live." 105 The recognition of the multiplicity of cultures and their treatment as equal partners allows them to contribute to the evolution of the national identity. Expecting members of cultural groups to accept the dominant "way of life," a phrase often repeated, translates to excluding them from taking part in the shaping of their society, which prevents them from changing and bringing new values to the national identity. However, through dialogue and interaction, the society will evolve with the participation of the minorities. Phillips was right to say that the common British identity should be strengthened, but in the evolution of this identity minorities have an important role to play.
VI. AccoMMoDATIoN of DIffERENT ALLEGIANcES
This article has noted that international law recognizes the importance of culture, stresses the equal respect of all cultures, and acknowledges that the individual enjoys various loyalties. The article also argued that international standards have shunned away from the idea of the neutral state, but have accepted that political institutions may need to take into account ethnic, religious, or cultural allegiances.
One of the main challenges for multiculturalism lies with the management of these allegiances when in conflict. Within a multicultural society clashes between cultural practices and values and human rights often occur. In the past, UN bodies have seemed eager to ignore such clashes and to avoid any discussion on such difficult issues; however, such issues are gradually being discussed more openly. 106 International instruments recognize that the right of religion or belief "may be subject to limitations," including morals and the rights of others. 107 The multiplicity of cultural frameworks that can influence the individual and the dialogue that international instruments encourage can contribute to the resolution of such clashes. Indeed, one can perceive the multiple cultural frameworks that may influence the individual as concentric circles around the individual. These include: the values of her family, the culture of her ethnic and religious group, her national identity, the values of the region she lives in, and finally, the loose values of humankind.
This model of concentric circles emphasizes the overlapping elements that cultural frameworks have. The discussion on the clash of civilizations has emphasized the conflicts of cultures 108 in a way that the commonalities of cultures have been largely neglected. Different cultures are not always in conflict with one another. Even when they differ on an issue, more dialogue can often reveal common underlying values. Although primarily interested in social groups, Iris Young's approach is particularly helpful for cultural frameworks. She views different groups as:
[O]verlapping, as constituted in relation to one another and thus as shifting their attributes and needs in accordance with what relations are salient. In my view, this relational conception of difference as contextual helps make more apparent both the necessity and possibility of political togetherness in difference. 109 In Young's model, difference does not mean otherness, or exclusive opposition, but rather specificity, variation, and heterogeneity. Different groups potentially share some attributes, experiences, or goals. Their differences will be more or less salient depending on the groups compared and the purposes of the comparison. The characteristics that make one group specific and the borders that distinguish it from other groups are always undecidable. Yet, all groups understand themselves as participants in the same society, subject to interaction, exchange, and interdependency. 110 The interaction sometimes causes friction and conflicts that are resolved following institutions and procedures of discussion that all participants have accepted as legitimately binding. It is important that the groups are not pushed towards a "forged cultural consensus or a symbolic order." 111 Viewing the cultural frameworks HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY as concentric circles around the individual is consistent with Young's concept of "the heterogeneous public."
112
The model of concentric circles also allows for the revisibility and reevaluation of cultural practices that are against human rights. As Kymlicka explains, these are important processes that can lead to mutual corrective engagements.
113 Through dialogue, group practices are challenged to accommodate in their own world the objective reality of the other. They interact, exchange ideas, and benefit from the cultures of all the groups rather than just from their own culture exclusively. If cultures are respected and celebrated, they become more open and more willing to re-evaluate practices and values. It must be recognized that the re-evaluation of cultural practices contributes to the evolution of the culture, avoids its stagnation, and makes it more relevant to the needs and realities of today's society. 114 Following this line of thought, the role of the state is not to remain blind to cultural attachments, but to protect them as much as to enable dialogue among them in a way that dialogue within them is possible. However, the role of the state is not to push for changes within the culture. Any revisions must come from the group itself; even more so, it must come from the affected members within the group. Who represents who in this process of dialogue and change is fundamental. The modalities of ensuring full participation and real representation is a difficult one, and possibly one where general rules do not always apply. Chandran Kukathas has pointed out the differences and conflicts of interests that could exist within any one group. He notes that when elites are confronted with modernization, they often develop distinct interests from the masses and in some cases they abuse the masses for personal ends. 115 Ensuring the multiplicity of voices, through political bodies, pressure groups, consultative bodies, party political influence, even in an unstructured manner, and encouraging the voices of the vulnerable members of all communities to be heard can only create hope that the dialogue will be inclusive. [I]dentity politics and cultural relativist paradigms are increasingly employed to constrain in particular the rights of women. Essentialized interpretations of culture are used either to justify violation of women's rights in the name of culture or to categorically condemn cultures "out there" as being inherently primitive and violent towards women. Both variants of cultural essentialism ignore the universal dimensions of patriarchal culture that subordinates, albeit differently, women in all societies and fails to recognize women's active agency in resisting and negotiating culture to improve their terms of existence.
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States have been known to use the concept of culture or religion to justify violations of women's rights. For example, in the recent discussion on the report of Saudi Arabia to CEDAW, the state delegate started the debate by recalling the references to the concept of "cultural diversity" in international human rights instruments and stressed this as the main criterion to assess women's human rights in his county.
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Madhavi Sunder notes that the United Nations has not empowered women to decide on clashes between their rights and their culture. State reservations to CEDAW that give preference to religious or customary laws have not been decided with the consent of the women affected. She notes that many "women argue that their governments-and the international human rights community-have improperly deferred to traditionalists and so-called cultural leaders' interpretations of private laws without taking proper account of modernizing views."
119 Maybe Sunder is too harsh on the United Nations. On other occasions, UN bodies have stressed the need for consultation with the affected women. When Greece noted that Muslim women face violations in Greece as a result of the application of Muslim law on the Muslim minority regarding marriage and inheritance, 120 the HRC asked for increased awareness of Muslim women of their rights and remedies, so that they could make informed decisions.
121 When Nigeria stated in its report to CERD that the decision of Muslim women to be subject to Muslim law-and thus harsher sentences-was theirs, the committee questioned the validity of the statement. 122 An attempt of the Central African Republic to suggest that women themselves do not want to have the same rights as men, despite the state's efforts, has been rightly rejected by the HRC. 123 In the 2006 concluding observations on Canada, the HRC expressed its concern about the discriminatory effects of the Indian Act against Aboriginal women and their children in matters of reserve membership and matrimonial property on reserve lands and urged the state to seek solutions with the informed consent of the indigenous peoples. The HRC also stressed "that balancing collective and individual interests on reserves to the sole detriment of women is not compatible with the Covenant . . . ." 124 A recent positive example of women deciding their cultural practices is the Charter on Feminist Principles for African Feminists that was adopted in Ghana in November 2006. In this Charter, African women evaluated and rejected some cultural practices that violate women's rights. 125 However, ensuring the validity of the individual's decisions on cultural practices that affect them is not without its challenges. On the one hand, it is important that the individual reaches this decision without inappropriate interference; on the other, it is equally important to respect the individual's decision, rather than label her as a victim of culturally generated false consciousness in need of liberation. 126 Marilyn Friedman sets a three step test to determine whether the individual has made the decision freely. First, they must "be able to choose among a significant and morally acceptable array of alternatives."Second, they must "be able to make their own choices relatively free of coercion, manipulation, and deception." And third, they must "have been able to develop, earlier in life, the capacities needed to reflect on their situations and make decisions about them." 127 Further, the individual must have the choice to exit the cultural group, should she feel restricted by its cultural values and practices. Kukathas places a lot of weight on the individual's right to exit provided that they have an open market society to enter. 128 Unfortunately, the right to exit is not always adequate for the protection of individuals against oppressive methods of groups. If someone has been denied education, literacy, and the right to learn about the world outside the group, she does not really have "a substantial freedom to leave because she lacks the preconditions" (knowledge and experience) to make "a meaningful choice." 129 Also, the right to exit puts the onus on women. It is the woman who has to leave and abandon her membership and group. 130 Ultimately, such a solution seems to sidetrack the problem as it maintains "a systematic and structural problem within . . . cultures and religions."
131 For these reasons Jeff Spinner-Halev sets some minimal standards that are needed to ensure that exit is really an option. "These standards include freedom from physical abuse, decent health care and nutrition, the ability to socialize with others, a minimal education . . . and a mainstream liberal society."
132
VII. THE RoLE of INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw
If the individual consents to a cultural practice that affects him, can that consent validate a cultural practice that violates a human right? In other words, will consent always validate a cultural practice, no matter how much it attacks the core of another human right? Also, what happens when the group has re-evaluated the cultural practice in question and still believes it to be valid even though it does violate the core of human rights? Must the international community stand by and continue to tolerate violations of human rights because the individual or the group in question refuses to acknowledge them? Some commentators argue that in these cases individual rights must prevail.133 Even though UN bodies have not yet taken a clear position on such dilemmas, some references appear to support the prevalence of human rights over the right to culture in such cases. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity reads: "No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope."
134 This seems to imply a pre-determined hierarchy whereby individual rights always prevail over cultural rights, ranging from patriarchal ideology to limited land rights. In 2001 the Commission on the Status of Women also It is my belief that a pre-determined hierarchy of individual rights above cultural rights is a simplistic solution that creates even more problems. A system that recognizes sub-national cultures in the public sphere up to the point where these cultures are inconsistent with the dominant culture does not seem appropriate. In fact, such an approach rings of cultural imperialism. It should not be forgotten that liberalism is the expression of a distinct moral faith and way of life; it is in itself a culture. 136 Insisting on the liberal model without adequate regard for other values justifies the complaints of vulnerable societies that international law has done nothing to salvage them and much to damage them; it is law that promises liberation, but oppresses. 137 Recent "contextual justice theories" put forward by Parekh and Joseph Carens have confronted this criticism. 138 Such theories aim to reconcile universal egalitarian principles of justice with claims based on identities and cultures of collectivities. Although framed within liberalism, contextual justice theories do not view universal principles-such as personal autonomy-as overriding principles that have to be accepted as they are, but suggest that adjustments may be needed to these principles in order to accommodate cultural and identity claims. Adjustments must be tailored to the particular circumstances of each context. Certainly, the level of these "adjustments" is important, as too much takes us to the point of cultural relativism; no adjustment at all takes us to the Kymlicka approach of overriding western liberal principles.
Certainly, human rights law does not accept any hierarchy among human rights, apart from the nonderogable rights. Any conflicts between rights, principles, and norms are generally solved on an ad hoc basis, after taking into account various considerations. The idea of concentric circles, also used by Carens, 139 stresses the existence of "the outermost circle," which contains "minimal standards of justice applicable to all contemporary states," called by Erin Kelly "international public reason." 140 International public reason stems from the belief that the international community operates "as a society of societies, with its own public culture and conception of public reason." 141 Steven Rockefeller has noted that from the liberal's point of view it is the individual's universal human identity and potential that is the most important one. 142 Although from a different starting point, feminist critics have also come to the same conclusion. Seyla Benhabib has stressed that to move away from universal claims about the importance of equality as a universal value underpinning feminism is to throw away the foundations that constitute "the branch on which we sit." Judith Butler, in a "similar, but different" way to Carens, argues for the critical acceptance of such foundations. 143 These foundations-in other words the common values that the whole humanity agree on-are expressed in the international decisions, including treaties, customary law, general principles, and soft law. They include the principle of non-derogation of some rights, such as the right to life and prohibition of torture. They also include the core of human rights, the essence of each human right. In my view, no cultural practices and beliefs can violate these values and no real adjustment can be initiated to these rights. This is clearly the position that the UN bodies have taken. For example, they have stressed that female circumcision cannot be tolerated at any time, no matter how embedded it is within the culture of the group, even when the women involved have given their consent for it. 144 "[F]amily violence and abuse, [including] forced marriage, dowry deaths, [and] acid attacks" have also been identified as unacceptable, irrespective of their being cultural practices. 145 The General Assembly has also condemned honor killings and has emphasized that "such crimes are incompatible with all religious and cultural values." I believe that cultural practices that restrict human rights without going so far as to violate the core of these rights can be tolerated in the name of cultural diversity. Whether these gray cultural practices should be accepted by the state even when the concerned individual agrees to be bound by these practices, should be a matter of judgment that will be reached after intercultural dialog. This will necessarily be an ad hoc decision, where all elements, interests, and rights are taken into account. In making these decisions, several principles must apply. International adjudication has elaborated such principles. 147 In Lovelace, 148 Kitok, 149 and Länsman, 150 the HRC asked for the existence of a reasonable and objective justification for the prevalence of one right over the other, consistency with human rights instruments, the necessity of the restriction, and proportionality. Further, it is argued that the complete neglect of one right-be it collective or individual-for the safe realization of the conflicting right would in most cases violate the principle of necessity. 151 Hence, in the concluding observations on Denmark, CERD recalled "that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries special duties and responsibilities." 152 In this manner, CERD implied that the core of both rights must be respected, even though on occasion freedom of opinion can be curtailed.
For example, these criteria can be applied to the current controversy surrounding headscarves: an adult woman who has reached the decision to wear a scarf after careful reflection, without considerable coercion or manipulation by others, and while living in a relatively open community must be free to do so. 153 Even if it is accepted that the covering of the head restricts women's rights, such restriction does not attack the core of the right and can be justified in order to allow the exercise of the right to culture. James Anaya stresses that any assessment about a cultural practice must allow a certain deference for the group's "own interpretive and decision-making processes in the application of universal human rights norms, just as states are accorded such deference." 154 When Muslim women suggest that wearing a headscarf is an empowering practice because it allows professional 155. leila aHmeD, wOmen anD genDer in islam: HisTOrical rOOTs OF a mODern DebaTe 223-24 (1992).
women to move from their rural homes and "emerge socially into a sexually integrated" urban world that "is still an alien, uncomfortable social reality for both women and men," 155 the state and ultimately the international community must take these views into account and place them in the general context. Based on these variants, this will be an ad hoc decision. Wearing the burqa, for example, may be a different matter. Even if the women wearing it have decided to do so in an open environment, where they were exposed to a variety of cultural frameworks, and they purport that this was their own choice, this article would argue that such a practice cannot really be justified in the name of any culture, as it seems to be violating the core of women's rights and to be insulting human dignity.
VIII. coNcLUSIoN
Current debate on multiculturalism and its limitations has largely neglected the obligations that states have agreed to under international law. Current interpretations of international instruments are gradually moving on from viewing the public sphere as an "objective" arena where cultural allegiances have no position. Currently, they stress the need for equal respect to every culture, be it the national, sub-national, or regional, and urge states to protect such cultural loyalties. Also, states are strongly encouraged to take positive measures in order to ensure the effective protection of sub-national groups and their cultures. Further, cultural groups must be recognized as equal partners and be allowed to have an input in the evolution of the national identity. Such inclusion promotes integration. Equally important is the need for interaction among groups within the society, as knowledge of cultural frameworks other than one's own discourages xenophobia and discrimination. Further, the multiplicity of cultural frameworks encourages the revisibility of cultural norms and practices, so that cultures evolve in a manner consistent with the common values that humanity has agreed on. Such common values are at the core of human rights and they form barriers to cultural practices. However, if a cultural practice does not violate these commonly agreed values, then the opinion of the group and the consent of the person affected must be the determining criteria. In clashes that can be resolved, decisions on which right will prevail in each case should be reached by applying established criteria rather than a pre-determined hierarchy. Universal human rights bodies have more or less remained silent in clashes that involve the right to culture. Recently though, more discussions are being held by the United Nations on these issues. Continuing debates
